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SMEs INVENTIVE PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY  
IN THE MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the inventive performance and profitability of small and medium sized 
firms (SMEs) that are “technology specialists” compared to the inventive performance and 
profitability of SMEs that are instead vertically-integrated. In this paper perspective, 
“technology specialists” are firms that specialize upstream in generating inventions and 
trade those inventions in disembodied form with other firms, usually through licensing 
agreements. Instead, vertically-integrated firms are those firms that both generate 
inventions and commercialize products incorporating those inventions. We argue that 
technology specialists achieve a higher inventive performance than vertically-integrated 
firms, since they can accumulate deeper and broader inventive experience, whilst keeping 
a more flexible organizational structure. These firms display a lower profitability though, 
due to the imperfections inherent in invention market transactions and the lower 
bargaining power caused by the lack of commercialization assets. The theoretical 
framework is tested through a cross-industry investigation on a sample of European 
SMEs. Implications for the viability of being a technology specialist as a strategy and for 
the development of markets for technology are discussed.  
 
Keywords: Markets for technologies; vertical boundaries; firm inventive performance; 
firm profitability; Small Medium Enterprises. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent studies have established the increasing importance of markets for technology 
(e.g., Arora et al., 2001; Krammer, 2014; Ritala and Hurmellinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Veer and 
Jell, 2012; Wang et al. 2012) – hereafter, MFT – that is, markets where inventions are traded 
as “free standing” entity, disembodied from individuals, organizations and products (e.g., 
Arora et al., 2001). In these markets firms can exchange their inventions for a price, usually 
through a licensing agreement, which is a contract where the owner of an invention allows 
another party the right to use or modify it in exchange of compensation (WIPO, 2014). 
Previous research on MFT has mainly taken a policy perspective on this phenomenon, 
arguing that the development of these markets allows for an efficient division of innovative 
labour among small and large firms according to their comparative advantage – which is, 
respectively, doing research and generating inventions for small firms, and producing and 
marketing the final products that embody new inventions for large firms (Arora et al., 2001; 
Arrow, 1983; Holmstrom, 1989). This type of configuration is socially desirable, in principle, 
since every type of firm focuses on the activity it performs better (Firth and Narayanan, 1996; 
Li and Tang, 2010); hence, a higher overall value might be generated compared to a situation 
where all firms internalize both the research and final product commercialization activities 
(e.g., Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Arora et al., 2001; Conceicao et al., 2012).  
However, the firm-level implications of MFT in terms of firm inventive performance 
(i.e. the extent to which a firm is capable of generating valuable inventions) and profitability 
have been largely neglected. It is not clear whether small firms are better off exploiting their 
comparative advantage in inventing by becoming “technology specialists” – that is, 
specializing upstream in the inventive activities and then sell their inventions in the MFT – or 
whether they should vertically integrate – that is, commercialize their own inventions to final 
customers. In particular, on the side of inventive performance, previous research on MFT has 
largely neglected how the interdependence between upstream invention and downstream 
  
product commercialization activities affects the firm’s capacity to generate high quality 
inventions; consequently we still lack an understanding of whether the inventive performance 
of technology specialists overcomes that of vertically-integrated small firms. At the same 
time, on the side of profitability, the literature on MFT has largely neglected to consider the 
ability of technology specialists to appropriate the economic returns of their inventions. 
Indeed, becoming a technology specialist and selling inventions to other firms requires firms 
to incur the private costs related to search and negotiation in the MFT (e.g. Fosfuri, 2006). In 
addition, being a technology specialist also implies that a firm lacks downstream, 
complementary assets that have been demonstrated to be a relevant source of bargaining 
power (e.g., McGahan and Silverman, 2006; Teece, 1986). Accordingly, we still do not know 
the extent to which – at the firm level – the economic benefits of being a technology specialist 
overcome the costs.  
This study fills in these gaps by investigating the following research question: how does 
the choice of being a technology specialist (as opposed to being a vertically-integrated firm) 
affect an SME’s inventive performance and profitability? Addressing these issues is 
important because it allows for an understanding as to what extent being a technology 
specialist is a viable strategy for an SME. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
section 2 we present our theory and hypotheses and in section 3 we describe the method that 
we used to test the hypotheses developed. In section 4 we present the empirical results, while 
in section 5 we discuss their implications to practice and theory. Finally, in section 6, we 
present the conclusions from the study.  
  
2. TECHNOLOGY SPECIALISTS VS. VERTICALLY-INTEGRATED SMES: 
IMPLICATIONS ON INVENTIVE PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY  
Building on the principles of specialization and division of labour (Smith, 1776; 
Stigler, 1951; Young, 1928), literature on MFT has argued that small and large firms are 
  
naturally endowed with different capabilities in inventing and commercializing; hence, they 
can benefit from specializing in the activity in which they are relatively more efficient (e.g., 
Arora et al. 2001; Ceccagnoli and Jiang, 2013). In particular, we can represent the innovation 
value chain as the chain of activities from upstream research activities – i.e., research and 
inventions generation – to downstream activities – i.e., large-scale development of those 
inventions into products, manufacturing and marketing to the final customers. Large, 
established firms, due to their highly bureaucratic structure, have a comparative advantage in 
performing downstream activities, which typically involve a high degree of routinization and 
standardization (Allarakhia and Walsh, 2011; Holmstrom 1989; Mangematin et al. 2011). 
Small firms, instead, have a comparative advantage in performing upstream research activities 
because, due to the low organizational distance between managers and researchers (e.g. 
Arrow, 1983; Marion et al., 2012), they are more likely to pursue risky but potentially 
extremely valuable technological trajectories (Arrow, 1983; Arora et al. 2001).  
These arguments suggest that, at the system level, the division of value chain activities 
among firms on the basis of their comparative advantage leads to the generation of a higher 
value compared to a situation where every firm performs all these activities (i.e. invention, 
development and commercialization to final customers) internally. Hence, based on this 
argument, it would appear preferable – from a social welfare perspective – if SMEs 
specialized in upstream research activities, i.e. if they became “technology specialists” (Arora 
et al 2001). However, existing research in this area provides only limited insight on whether 
operating as a technology specialist also brings a “private” advantage to SMEs, that is, 
whether technology specialists have a better performance compared to the vertically-
integrated SMEs, i.e. those SMEs that internalize all value chain activities. More precisely, 
existing research on MFT has provided only limited consideration to the interdependence 
between upstream invention generation and downstream commercialization activities. 
Consequently, existing research has not investigated the extent to which this interdependence 
  
affects the inventive performance of small firms that are technology specialists, and only 
focus on the generation of inventions, vs. vertically-integrated small firms, which internalize 
both activities.  
In addition, existing research on MFT has not investigated the extent to which SMEs’ 
profitability is affected by the choice between upstream specialization vs. vertical integration. 
Becoming a technology specialist implies undertaking search and negotiation activities in the 
MFT; hence, it might require incurring additional costs that might reduce SME’s profitability 
(e.g. Leiblein and Madsen, 2009). The extent to which these costs overcome the benefits of 
being a technology specialist has been overlooked by extant literature. Furthermore, a 
technology specialist lacks downstream complementary assets that a vertically-integrated firm 
instead possesses, with possible implications on its bargaining power and consequently on its 
profitability compared to a vertically-integrated SME (e.g. Fosfuri, 2006; Leiblein and 
Madsen, 2009). However, these implications have been neglected by extant studies. The goal 
of this paper is to fill this gap and compare the implications for an SME of being a technology 
specialist vs. being vertically-integrated, in terms of both their inventive performance and 
profitability. In doing so this paper contributes to improving our understanding on the 
performance of SMEs (Hoffman et al. 1998). 
We argue that being a technology specialist (as opposed to being a vertically-
integrated firm) has a positive impact on a small firm inventive performance for two reasons. 
The first reason relates to the deeper and broader inventive experience that technology 
specialists can accumulate (Leiblein and Madsen, 2009). Technology specialists devote all 
their efforts and resources to their inventive activity (Arora et al., 2001). This makes them 
more likely to enjoy faster accumulation of inventive experience in their technological fields 
compared to vertically-integrated small firms – which instead spread their resources and 
attention across upstream (i.e., invention) and downstream (i.e., commercialization) activities. 
While this argument holds for any firm (regardless of its size), it is even more salient for 
  
small firms, whose resource endowments are typically scarcer compared to those of larger 
firms (Teece, 1986). This implies that technology specialist SMEs tend to acquire a “deeper” 
inventive experience than vertically-integrated SMEs (Diez-Vial, 2009; Yelle, 1979).  
At the same time, because technology specialists have the ultimate goal to sell or 
license their technologies to other firms (Bianchi et al., 2011; Veer and Jell, 2012), they have 
the incentive to generate inventions that target a greater variety of business applications and 
customer needs compared to vertically-integrated firms, whose research activity mainly serves 
in-house needs (Arora et al. 2001; Grant, 2002; Hicks and Hegde, 2005). This argument holds 
a fortiori for smaller vertically-integrated firms, which, due to their resource constraints, 
usually operate in a limited set of market niches. This implies that technology specialists tend 
to acquire a “broader” inventive experience than vertically-integrated firms and this effect is 
even stronger in the case of SMEs (Hicks and Hegde, 2005). Both a depth and breadth of 
inventive experience enables lessons learned from experience to accrue more steadily, thus 
generating better inventions (Katila and Ahuja, 2002).  
The second reason why being a technology specialist (as opposed to being a vertically-
integrated firm) has a positive impact on a small firm’s inventive performance is related to the 
organizational structure typically characterising technology specialists vs. vertically-
integrated firms, which makes the former better positioned to generate valuable inventions. A 
vertically-integrated firm is likely to display tight interdependences between upstream 
organizational units – focused on research and on the generation of valuable inventions – and 
downstream units – commercializing those inventions embodied into products for final 
customers (Taylor and Helfat, 2009). These interdependences are likely to inhibit the 
generation of path-breaking inventions and rather favour path dependence at the expense of 
novelty (Powell, 1992; Taylor and Helfat, 2009). A very clear illustration for this mechanism 
is presented by Fosfuri and Roende (2009). Vertically-integrated companies are companies 
where an upstream R&D unit and a downstream manufacturing unit coexist. In principle the 
  
R&D unit may select the research trajectory to be pursued between multiple alternatives, 
which vary in their value and novelty. For instance, the R&D unit might choose between 
research trajectories likely to deliver radical and extremely valuable inventions, and other 
trajectories probably resulting in incremental inventions. Choosing a research trajectory 
oriented to the generation of radical inventions is likely to require the creation of new sets of 
manufacturing routines and expertise – and so, huge adaptation costs in the production units 
(e.g. Linton and Walsh, 2013). This implies that these more radical trajectories naturally meet 
a strong internal resistance (Henderson, 1993; Henderson and Clark, 1990) in vertically-
integrated firms. To avoid a costly internal conflict, the R&D units of vertically-integrated 
firms are likely to lean towards incremental (though probably less valuable) research 
trajectories.  
A large bulk of empirical evidence supports the idea that vertically-integrated firms 
present systemic resistance to generating radical inventions that alter the relationships among 
different stages of the production process (Glasmeier, 1991; Mariotti and Cainarca, 1986; 
O’Connor and DeMartino, 2006; Tripsas, 1997). In contrast, technology specialists can take 
advantage of a higher degree of freedom in their decision making, which stems from the 
absence of the typical organizational and coordinative constraints that characterize vertically-
integrated firms. Given that experimentation and risk taking are crucial in the discovery of 
valuable technological solutions (e.g., Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Gupta et al., 2006), we 
suggest that the greater opportunity of technology specialists compared to vertically-
integrated firms to undertake radical research paths is likely to result in a greater ability to 
generate valuable inventions. 
All these arguments lead us to predict: 
Hypothesis 1: Technology specialist SMEs have higher inventive performance than 
vertically-integrated SMEs. 
  
While being a technology specialist may positively affect SMEs’ inventive 
performance, at the same time it may also hamper their profitability for two reasons related 
respectively to: a) the imperfections that plague the MFT functioning (e.g. Cockburn, 2007; 
Gans et al., 2008) and b) the lower bargaining power of technology specialists in negotiations 
due to their lack of downstream (i.e. commercialization) assets (McGahan and Silverman, 
2006; Teece, 1986).  
Consider first the imperfections that obstruct the functioning of MFT. Existing 
research has emphasized how the actual volume of technology transactions occurring in MFT 
is much lower than it could be due to several imperfections in the functioning of these 
markets (Gans et al.2008; Giuri et al., 2007). This clearly hampers the technology specialists’ 
possibility to make profits through invention trading. For instance, it is usually quite 
complicated for a company that has generated a new invention to identify the right buyer, 
since this involves scanning multiple market niches and identifying technological problems to 
which the invention could constitute a solution (Ceccagnoli and Jiang, 2013; Cockburn, 
2007). This generates very high search costs and, consequently, a reduction in the profits that 
technology specialists can generate by selling their technologies in MFT. 
Moreover, even once a potential buyer has been found, uncertainty about the market 
value of an invention might obstruct the transaction (Gambardella, 2013). Having generated 
the invention the seller, compared to the buyer, usually has more information regarding its 
true value (Gans et al., 2008). This information asymmetry leads to a classic adverse selection 
problem (Beggs, 1992; Sakakibara, 2010) because the buyers are not always capable of 
selecting between good and bad inventions and they make offers that take into consideration 
the possibility that the acquired invention might be a low quality one (Cockburn, 2007). As a 
result, sellers of good inventions end up receiving offers that are lower than what they know 
would be fair, which reduces the likelihood of an agreement with the buyer. A similar 
dynamic also occurs in the circumstance in which the inventing firm itself is uncertain about 
  
the true value of its inventions – such as in the case of very novel and path-breaking 
inventions. In this situation inventing firms tend to be overoptimistic about the quality of their 
own inventions (Dushnitsky, 2010; Giuri et al. 2007). This reduces the chance to agree with 
the buyer on a price, because even fair offers tend to be perceived by the inventor as too low. 
Overall, the difficulties in reaching an agreement about the value of the invention with any 
potential buyers hamper the possibility that technology specialists will generate profits from 
their inventions. Consistently with these arguments, previous research has found that 
divergences over the financial terms of licensing agreements – which is the usual way an 
invention is sold in MFT – are some of the major reasons why negotiations break down 
(Cockburn, 2007). 
Finally, the trading of inventions is plagued by possible opportunistic behaviours by 
the transaction counterparts, especially in the absence of “appropriate intellectual property 
rules, procedures, and protection” (Gouvea et al. 2012, p. 563). Such moral hazard issues are 
likely to induce prospective buyers to consider with caution the option of buying an invention 
on the market (Dechenaux et al. 2011; Dushnitsky, 2010). This is due to the fact that the 
knowledge underlying the inventions often displays tacit components in addition to codified 
components (Arora, 1996; Winter, 1987). The effective transfer of such knowledge, therefore, 
requires a certain amount of complementary effort from the inventing firm side to assist the 
buyer in the complete understanding and integration of the invention in its products (Leone 
and Reichstein, 2012). However, inventing firms might display opportunistic behaviours and 
try to skimp on the full effort required to transfer knowledge to the buyer (Arora, 1996). This 
issue is further complicated by the fact that transactions of inventions often require highly 
specialized complementary investments from the buyers, who are consequently exposed to the 
risk of “hold up” (Shane, 2002). The risk of moral hazard and hold up reduces potential 
buyers’ propensity to acquire external inventions. From the point of view of a technology 
specialist, this results in a further obstacle to profit from invention trading. 
  
Besides MFT imperfections, the second reason why technology specialists tend to be less 
profitable than vertically-integrated small firms is that a vertically-integrated firm – by 
definition provided with downstream assets – can sell its inventions embodied into final 
products, without having to negotiate with a counterpart; by contrast, a technology specialist 
has to engage in a negotiation with a firm provided with downstream assets to sell its 
inventions. In this type of negotiation, the margins accruing to the technology specialist tend 
to be squeezed due to the stronger bargaining position of the buyer that originates from the 
possession of downstream (commercialization) vis-a-vis upstream (research) assets (Chiu et 
al. 2008). Hence, since the possession of downstream assets represents a critical determinant 
of the ability to appropriate the economic returns of an invention (e.g. Teece, 1986), 
vertically-integrated firms are better able to profit from their inventions compared to 
technology specialists.  
Previous empirical evidence supports our line of reasoning. For instance, Arora and 
Nandkumar (2012), examining the software security industry, found that MFT raise the value 
of marketing capabilities in ensuring firm survival, and simultaneously decrease the value of 
technological capabilities. In the same vein, but using a much broader dataset on all publicly 
traded U.S. firms, McGahan and Silverman (2006) show that the stock market value of firms 
controlling downstream assets in a focal industry increases when outsider players generate 
inventions that could be fruitfully commercialized within the industry. This happens because 
outsiders usually don’t possess the relevant downstream assets to operate in the industry. As a 
result, insiders tend to enjoy a higher bargaining power in negotiations and eventually 
appropriate a greater portion of the value generated through the transaction of inventions, 
reducing the profits accruing to firms who do not possess downstream assets (i.e. technology 
specialists). 
To summarize, the imperfections of MFT and the limited bargaining power of technology 
specialists determined by their lack of downstream assets exert a negative effect on the ability 
  
of technology specialists to profit from their inventions in MFT. Accordingly, we hypothesize 
that: 
Hypothesis 2: Technology specialist SMEs have lower profitability than vertically- 
integrated SMEs.  
 
3. METHOD 
The empirical investigation of this study was accomplished on a population of European-
based SMEs, across all industries, within the timeframe 1996-2001. Coverage across all 
industries provides the advantage of permitting a systematic investigation of the study’s 
predictions. Geographic restriction to Europe is motivated by the fact that huge institutional 
differences characterize markets for technology across different regions throughout the world, 
a circumstance that may have an impact on the performance of the firms under investigation 
in this study (Ginarte and Park, 1997). As a consequence, focusing on a specific and relatively 
homogenous geographical area may guarantee that many of these features remain constant 
across this study sample, enabling a more robust test of the hypotheses. However, as the 
appropriability regime may still be expected to vary from country to country even within the 
European area, a control for the strength of patent protection was included in the statistical 
analyses (Ginarte and Park, 1997).  
While the 1990s were characterized by the steady increase in the volume of market 
transactions of inventions and by the increase in variance across firms in terms of their 
vertical boundaries and invention-commercialization choices, the greatest changes in this 
direction occurred – at least in Europe – in the second half of the 1990s, that is the temporal 
window on which this study is focused.  
 
3.1 Sample and data     
  
We used a cross-sectional dataset of Europe-based SMEs across all industries in the 
timeframe 1996-2001 to test our hypotheses. The choice of employing a cross-sectional 
dataset instead of a panel dataset is motivated by the concern for the reliability of yearly data 
on invention commercialization strategies, provided that our sample is composed by SMEs. 
Indeed, forming a panel dataset would require the collection of yearly data on firms’ 
invention commercialization strategies (i.e. yearly data on whether each firm had sold or 
licensed its inventions to other firms or had embodied its inventions into products). Having 
conducted an accurate and extensive pilot search on multiple data sources (including Business 
& Industry, Factiva, Zephyr and Securities Data Corporation databases as well as company 
web sites and specialized websites) we discovered that collecting yearly data for small private 
companies was problematic since these firms do not receive systematic media coverage. 
Therefore it is not possible to find each licensing agreement or each product launched by each 
of these companies in each single year reported on public sources.  
However, our pilot search supported the idea that expanding our cross-sectional analysis 
to a time window of six years would lead to a reliable assessment of firms’ strategies. In fact, 
we found that if a company engages in a strategy of exclusively using licensing agreements to 
commercialize its inventions, the likelihood that in a period of six years at least one of its 
licensing agreements will be announced on a website or in a corporate report is quite high. 
Similarly, if a company has launched products based on its inventions, this information is 
likely to appear at least once on the materials we collected on the company in the six years 
window of reference.  
Furthermore, the invention commercialization strategies of firms in our sample seem 
quite stable in the temporal window under investigation of our study. Hence, a cross-sectional 
perspective seems not only a way to bypass the reliability problem that a panel approach 
would cause, but also a more appropriate approach from the standpoint of yearly data 
  
variability. The choice of using a cross-sectional dataset is in fact in line with other studies in 
the field such as Arora and Gambardella (1990); Fosfuri (2006) and Gans et al. (2002). 
Firms that had at least one EPO-granted patent that had been applied for within the time 
frame 1996-2001 were included in the sample. Using the patent application date and not the 
grant date enables us to control for differences in delays that may occur in granting patents 
after the application is filed (e.g Trajtenberg, 1990). Furthermore, the protection of patent, 
once granted, is retroactive and also covers the application period. Two motivations underlie 
the decision to include in the sample firms with at least one patented invention. First, patents 
represent an externally validated measure of inventive activity (Belenzon and Patacconi, 
2013; Griliches, 1990). Second, patent protection reduces several frictions that typically 
characterize the trading of inventions and has a huge effect on the likelihood of selling or 
licensing an invention to other firms (e.g., Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gans et al., 2008). 
Hence including firms with at least one patented invention allows a reliable identification of 
the firms “at risk” of engaging in invention trading activities.  
Company names identified from the patent database have been matched with company 
names from the Amadeus database (Bureau van Dijk); hence both listed and non-listed 
companies were included in our sample. Checks for misspelling of company names were 
made and corrected. Subsidiaries at the parent level were then tracked on Amadeus, in order 
to exclude from the sample all firms that proved to be subsidiaries of large firms or joint 
ventures. Amadeus was then employed to discriminate between large and small-medium 
firms. As this study is concerned with SMEs, firms were retained in the sample only if they 
showed no more than 250 employees in at least one year within the timeframe 1996-2001 
covered by this study. As indicated by the European Commission, 250 employees is the 
standard cut-off point to identify SMEs in the European context (Recommendation 
2003/361/EC). 
  
These sample construction rules provided the master list that was employed to collect the 
data that we used in this study. Data on firms’ vertical integration and invention trade were 
collected and triangulated through an extensive search of press releases, including Business & 
Industry, Factiva, Zephyr and the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) databases as well as 
from company web sites. In cases where this information was not available from current 
companies’ websites, or if the companies’ websites were no longer active, the Internet 
Archive’s Wayback Machine was used to visit the past websites (Yadav et al., 2007). Data on 
firms’ inventive portfolios was collected using PatStat. Data on firms’ age were obtained from 
company websites and Internet archives. Amadeus was employed to collect data on firms’ 
profitability and size across the whole timeframe covered by this study. Finally, to obtain data 
on the strength of the appropriability regime across the different European countries included 
in this study sample, this paper referred to publications by Park (2008) and Ginarte and Park 
(1997).  
The final sample included 551 firms, of which 20 were technology specialists. Basic 
characteristics of industry affiliation and country of origins of the firms included in our 
sample are displayed in Tables 1 and 2. 
TABLE 1. Industry Affiliation: Overall Sample and Technology Specialists 
 
All firms in the sample Technology Specialists 
Description US 
SIC  
Num % Cum % Num % Cum % 
Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer 
Equipment 
35 173 31.40% 31.40%    
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And 
Transportation Equipment 
34 66 11.98% 43.38% 2 10.00% 10.00% 
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And 
Related Services 
87 50 9.07% 52.45% 13 65.00% 75.00% 
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And 
Components, Except Computer Equipment 
36 43 7.80% 60.25%    
Chemicals And Allied Products 28 42 7.62% 67.88% 3 15.00% 90.00% 
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; 
Photographic, Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And 
Clocks 
38 29 5.26% 73.14%    
Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products 30 24 4.36% 77.50%    
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 39 21 3.81% 81.31%    
Business Services 73 12 2.18% 83.48%    
Primary Metal Industries 33 10 1.81% 85.30%    
Furniture And Fixtures 25 10 1.81% 87.11%    
Transportation Equipment 37 9 1.63% 88.75%    
Paper And Allied Products 26 7 1.27% 90.02%    
Lumber And Wood Products, Except Furniture 24 7 1.27% 91.29%    
  
Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products 32 6 1.09% 92.38%    
Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics 
And Similar Materials 
23 5 0.91% 93.28%    
Agricultural Production  01 4 0.73% 94.01%    
Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction 
Contractors 
16 4 0.73% 94.74%    
Textile Mill Products 22 4 0.73% 95.46%    
Food And Kindred Products 20 3 0.54% 96.01%    
Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 27 3 0.54% 96.55% 1 5.00% 95.00% 
Building Construction General Contractors And Operative 
Builders 
15 3 0.54% 97.10%    
Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 49 3 0.54% 97.64%    
Leather And Leather Products 31 2 0.36% 98.00%    
Oil And Gas Extraction 13 2 0.36% 98.37% 1 5.00% 100.0% 
Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, And Mobile 
Home Dealers 
52 2 0.36% 98.73%    
Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except 
Fuels 
14 1 0.18% 98.91%    
Construction Special Trade Contractors 17 1 0.18% 99.09%    
Petroleum Refining And Related Industries 29 1 0.18% 99.27%    
Transportation By Air 45 1 0.18% 99.46%    
Transportation Services 47 1 0.18% 99.64%    
Apparel And Accessory Stores 56 1 0.18% 99.82%    
Personal Services 72 1 0.18% 100.0%    
TOTAL  551   20   
 
TABLE 2. Country of Origin: Overall Sample and Technology Specialists 
 
All sample Technology Specialists 
Country  Number % Cum % Number % Cum % 
Italy 300 54.45% 54.45% 
   France 73 13.25% 67.70% 1 5.00% 5.00% 
Finland 38 6.90% 74.60% 3 15.00% 20.00% 
Great 
Britain 37 6.72% 81.32% 8 40.00% 60.00% 
Netherlands 29 5.26% 86.58% 
   Spain 25 4.54% 91.12% 1 5.00% 65.00% 
Norway 19 3.45% 94.57% 3 15.00% 80.00% 
Germany 16 2.90% 97.47% 1 5.00% 85.00% 
Denmark 14 2.54% 100.00% 3 15.00% 100.00% 
TOTAL 551 
  
20 
  
 
Table 1 reports the industry affiliation for all firms in the sample on the basis of US SIC 
codes. The table is organized to allow for an immediate comparison between the distribution 
across industries of the overall sample and the distribution across industries of the technology 
specialists. Table 1 shows that the overall sample of our European innovative SMEs tends to 
be distributed across high and low tech industries, though a relatively larger majority of them 
actually belongs to high tech sectors. In fact, the most represented industries where European 
innovative SMEs are active are SIC 35 (31.4%, Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer Equipment), SIC 34 (11.98%, Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and 
Transportation Equipment); SIC 87 (9.07%, Engineering, Accounting, Research, 
  
Management and Related Services);  SIC 36 (7.80%, Electronic,  Other Electrical Equipment 
and Components); SIC 28 (7.62%, Chemicals and Allied Products); SIC 38 (5.26%, 
Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical and Optical 
Goods; Watches and Clocks) and SIC 30 (4.36%  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics 
Products). Overall, firms in these sectors constitute more than 75% of the sample, and these 
sectors represent predominantly – though not exclusively – high tech business activities. 
Firms in the remaining sectors are fragmented across a high number of industries, where high 
tech business activities are much less represented.  
By replicating the same analysis for technology specialists, we observe that technology 
specialists are relatively more concentrated in high tech industries compared to the overall 
sample. In particular, we find that the great majority of technology specialists belong to SIC 
87 (65%, Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management and Related Services). Other SIC 
represented include SIC 28 (15% Chemicals and Allied Products); SIC 34 (10%,  Fabricated 
Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transportation Equipment); SIC 27 (5%, Building 
Construction General Contractors and Operative Builders) and SIC 13 (5%, Oil and Gas 
Extraction). In order to understand in more detail the activity of technology specialists, which 
constitute the focus of our investigation, we closely investigated the inventive profile of the 
companies that became technology specialists. Concerning the technological area of activity 
of technology specialists, we find that among the 20 technology specialists, 55% (11 
companies) are in the biotech technological field. Among the remaining companies, 2 focus 
on the generation of mechanical technologies for the aeronautic and automotive sectors; 2 are 
in IT/electronics (generating magnetic tagging technologies and technologies for 
switchboards); 3 companies generate chemical technologies (generating respectively 
thermoplastic elastomer technologies, composting technologies and chemical active 
ingredients), 1 company generates toys and 1 company generates technologies for oil and gas 
offshoring.  
  
Overall, technology specialists in our sample appear to be concentrated in high tech 
sectors characterized by strong appropriability regimes. Moreover the majority of technology 
specialists are in the biotech sector. This is in line with extant studies on MFT indicating 
biotechnology as one of the fields where invention trade has developed more in the last 
decades (Arora et al. 2001; Bianchi et al., 2011). Indeed, research in this area indicates that – 
beginning in the 1970s, several small R&D intensive biotech companies, mostly US-based, 
entered the industry. Through time the sector in the US consolidated towards a structure of 
small upstream technology specialists (Arora et al. 2001), trading their inventions to 
downstream companies. The analysis of the characteristics of our sample indicates that also in 
Europe, small biotechnologies firms tend to represent a high portion of the firms operating in 
MFT.  
In Table 2 we report the distribution of our sample across countries. We note that 54.45% 
of the sample is composed by Italian companies, 13.25 % by French companies, 6.90% by 
Finnish companies, 6.72% by British companies and 5.26% by Dutch companies. The 
remaining 13.43% is composed by Spanish, Norwegian, German and Danish companies. We 
did not impose any geographic restriction in our sample, which included all European firms 
available in the Amadeus database having been granted at least 1 patent that had been applied 
at the EPO office in 1996-2001, and having no more than 250 employees in the same period. 
Therefore the distribution of our sample is to some extent also informative of the geographical 
distribution of the population of these types of firms. The predominance of Italian firms in our 
sample is consistent with the evidence that the Italian economy is essentially based on small 
and medium enterprises. For instance, in 1991, 24.2% of manufacturing firms in Italy had less 
than 10 employees, compared to 13.3% in the UK and 7.8% in Germany (OECD, 1997). 
It is also interesting to note that when we move to the sub-sample of technology 
specialists, the distribution indicates that 40% of the sample is composed by British 
companies; another 45% is equally distributed amongst Danish, Finnish and Norwegian 
  
companies and finally, France, Spain and Germany constitute 5% of the sample each. Britain, 
Denmark and Norway are the countries where the ratio specialists versus non-specialists is the 
highest (specialists constitute, respectively, 22%, 21% and 16% of the companies from those 
countries in the sample) compared to the other European countries included in our sample.   
 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
This study employs two dependent variables corresponding to two distinct dimensions of 
firm performance: inventive performance and profitability. As already specified, in order to 
investigate firm inventive performance, we refer to patent data. However, patents 
substantially vary in their economic and technological value (Griliches, 1984; Sreekumaran 
Nair et al., 2011; Trajtenberg, 1990). Thus, patent citations are a better indicator of the 
importance or value of patents than simple patent counts (Frietsch et al. 2014; Galasso and 
Simcoe, 2011; Hall et al. 2005; Hess and Rothaermel, 2011; Kelley et al., 2011; Trajtenberg, 
1990). Following extant literature in this area, we measure firm inventive performance using a 
citations-based index, i.e. weighting each patent i of the firm by the actual number of citations 
(Ci) that it subsequently received (Trajtenberg, 1990). In particular, for each firm in the 
sample, the INVENTIVE PERFORMANCE variable was computed as ∑           , where n 
is the count of the EPO-granted patents that had been applied for by the focal firm within the 
timeframe 1996-2001 and Ci is the number of citations subsequently received by each patent. 
Existing research suggests that the use of a citation-based measure of inventive activities 
effectively captures the value of the inventions developed by the firm (e.g. Galasso and 
Simcoe, 2011; Hess and Rothaermel, 2011; Trajtenberg, 1990), hence the use of this indicator 
is consistent with the theory developed in this paper.  
In calculating this variable two important issues were taken into account. First, citation 
counts are inherently truncated (Hall et al. 2005; Rosenzweig and Mazursky, 2013). Patents 
  
continue to receive citations for long periods of time, while we observe only citations up to a 
certain point in time. Moreover, citations to patents applied for in earlier time periods (that 
had a longer time window to be cited) cannot be aggregated and compared with citations to 
patents applied for more recently. In order to address this concern, for each patent of each 
firm in our sample, we counted the number of citations received in the first three years after 
patent grant. 
Second, inventors are likely to patent their inventions in multiple patent offices. In these 
cases the same invention receives a different patent number, although the two patents are 
“equivalent” from an invention standpoint. In particular extant literature suggests that unlike 
US patents, a large share of EPO patents are cited indirectly through their non-EPO 
equivalent (Hall et al. 2007). A proper count of forward citations should therefore also include 
citations received by patent equivalents (Harhoff et al., 2006). In order to address this issue 
we used the Patstat dataset to reconstruct patent families and track all citations received by 
each patent of each firm in the sample, including those to the patents non-EPO equivalent. 
This variable construction provided the measure of invention performance employed in this 
study.  
To assess firm PROFITABILITY, we calculated for each firm in the sample the average of 
the company’s Return on Assets (ROA) obtained within the timeframe 1996-2001.  
3.2.2 Independent Variable 
Our independent variable indicates whether or not a firm had been a technology specialist 
within the timeframe under investigation in this study. Consistently with our theory we use 
the expression technology specialist to indicate a firm that commercializes its inventions 
exclusively as free standing entities as opposed to integrating these inventions into products. 
To identify firms that have traded their inventions we refer to firms who have engaged in 
invention licensing activities, following a large body of prior research in this area (e.g. Arora 
et al. 2001; Fosfuri, 2006; Somaya et al.,2011; Leone and Reichstein, 2012). Accordingly, for 
  
each firm a dichotomous variable, TECHNOLOGY SPECIALIST, was constructed and valued 
1 if we found evidence that, in the period 1996-2001, (1) the firm engaged in licensing 
activities and (2) had not embodied its inventions into products, 0 otherwise. For each of the 
companies in our sample, we extensively searched different sources available (including 
Business & Industry, Factiva, Zephyr and the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) databases as 
well as company websites and specialized websites) to identify announcements and reports 
mentioning the name of the firm. We used the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine to visit 
the version of the websites published in the period 1996-2001 (Yadav et al., 2007). We read 
the full text of all announcements. To assess whether the company had engaged in licensing 
activity we referred to the content of the announcement. For instance, we identified as 
technology licensing agreements those cases in which the announcement: a) mentioned the 
transfers of inventions from the focal firm to other firms; b) included words such as ‘license’ 
or ‘licensing’; or c) mentioned that the focal firm received a payment for the transfer of its 
invention (e.g., referring to some specific licensing terms such as ‘royalties’ or ‘fees’). We 
also reviewed these sources to assess whether the firm, in the six years of interest, had not 
embodied the invention into products. To assess this, we referred to the same sources 
mentioned above. In many cases, companies explicitly specified their strategy on their 
website or in their reports. When this information was not available, we searched the 
company website to check whether any products were advertised. We also searched news and 
specialized press to identify any announcements regarding product launches. Finally, in some 
cases we used the presence of manufacturing facilities to assess whether the company was 
active in the product market.  
3.2.3 Control Variables 
There is a recognized – although controversial – relationship between a firm‘s size and its 
inventive performance (e.g., Berends et al, 2014; Cohen and Klepper, 1991; Feldman, 1997; 
Koen, 1992; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Revilla and Fernandez, 2012; Rothwell and Zegveld, 
  
1982; Rubenstein and Ettlie, 1983; Shefer and Frenkel, 2005). The size of a firm may also 
affect its profitability in different ways (e.g. Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007; Mas-Ruiz and 
Ruiz-Moreno, 2011). Indeed, compared to large firms, small firms may be less able to exploit 
economies of scale and scope, or be more financially constrained (e.g., Teece, 1986) which 
may cause a negative effect on the cost of capital (e.g. Apitado and Millington, 1992; 
Beedles, 1992). Although this study sample is formed by SMEs, a variance across the size of 
the firms in the sample is present and may affect the result of the statistical analysis. To 
control for these effects, we calculated the variable SIZE for each firm as the minimum 
number of employees between 1996 and 2001.  
This study also controlled for firms’ age. On the one hand, age may affect the ability of a 
firm to build a reputation as a competent, reliable and trustworthy inventing firm, and 
consequently may have a positive impact on the chance to have its inventions accepted by the 
market and profit (Danneels, 2002; Dowling and Helm, 2006; Katila, 2002). On the other 
hand, age may create organizational inertia and so negatively affect the firm inventive 
performance (Katila, 2002; Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). To control for all these effects, this 
study employed an AGE variable that was constructed for each firm as a count of the years 
elapsed from the firm’s foundation year to 2001.  
Characteristics of the firms’ inventive portfolio may also have an impact on firm 
performance. One of the more critical characteristics in this regard is the generality of a firm’s 
inventive portfolio, i.e. the attitude of a firm to generate inventions more broadly applicable to 
a wide range of markets (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Gambardella and Giarratana, 
2013; Hall et al., 2000; Valentini, 2012). By allowing access to a wider array of markets, a 
more general inventive portfolio may provide the firms with bigger market size, with positive 
effects on profitability. To control for these effects, we measured the generality of the 
inventions according to the procedure employed by Trajtenberg et al. (1997). This measure 
accounts for the extent to which citations received by a patent are spread across different 
  
technological classes. Specifically, for each patent i granted to the firms in our sample and 
applied in 1996-2001, the patent generality measure was calculated for each patent i, as 
follows: Patent Generalityi = 1 – ∑           where     indicates the share of citations received by 
patent i from patents belonging to patent class j, out of n patent classes. To account for any 
forward citations truncation issues (Hall et al., 2005; Rosenzweig and Mazursky, 2013) we 
calculated the measure by using the citations received by each patent in the first three years 
after patent grant. The patent generality measure was then averaged at the firm level to obtain 
a FIRM INVENTION GENERALITY variable. 
We also control for the strength of the appropriability regime, which might exert an 
important impact not only in determining the strategy chosen by a firm to commercialize its 
inventions (Teece’s, 1986) but also on the firm propensity to engage in invention activities in 
the first place (Dosi et al., 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2014; Teece, 1986). Hence, we 
controlled for the differences in the strength of patent rights across the European countries 
represented in this study sample by constructing a PATENT STRENGTH control variable on 
the basis of the index of patent protection developed by Park (2008). This study was an 
update to 2005 and an extension to 122 countries of a previously developed patent protection 
index by Ginarte and Park (1997) covering 110 countries and referring to a time span from 
1960 to 1990. In both studies, the index of patent protection was constructed, per country per 
quinquennium – within the timeframe 1960-1990 (Ginarte and Park, 1997) and the timeframe 
1995-2005 (Park, 2008) – on the basis of five categories of patent laws: 1) extent of coverage; 
2) membership in international patent agreements; 3) provisions for loss of protection; 4) 
enforcement mechanisms; 5) duration. For each country and for each period, they then scored 
each of these categories a value ranging from 0 to 1 and then summed up to constitute an 
overall value of patent index (per country per period) ranging from 0 to 5. To construct our 
measure of PATENT STRENGTH, per each European country included in this study sample, 
  
we took the average of the 1995 and 2000 patent protection index values. These results were 
then normalized so that the strongest possible level of patent protection is equal to 1.  
Finally, we included a set of INDUSTRY DUMMIES in order to control for industry 
(defined at the level of one digit SIC code) specific effects. Descriptive statistics and 
correlations are displayed in Table 3. 
  
TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlationa 
Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlation 
Variables 
 
Description Obs Mean SD Min 
 
Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. INVENTIVE 
PERFORMANCE  
∑           , where n is the count 
of the EPO-granted patents that 
had been applied for within the 
timeframe 1996-2001 and Ci is 
the number of citations 
subsequently received by each 
patent 
 
551 3.492 7.447 1.000 106.000 1       
2. PROFITABILITY Mean of the company’s Return on 
Assets (ROA) obtained within the 
timeframe 1996-2001  
551 5.230 15.050 -81.043 57.600 -
0.133*** 
1      
3. TECHNOLOGY 
SPECIALIST 
Dummy variable taking value 1 is 
the firm engaged in licensing 
activity and did not sell products 
in the period 1996-2001 
551 0.036 0.187 0.000 1.000 0.067 -
0.333*** 
1     
4. SIZE The minimum number of 
employees of the firm between 
1996 and 2001 
551 55.595 54.877 1.000 248.000 0.107** 0.110** -
0.132*** 
1    
5. AGE Count of the years elapsed from 
the firm’s foundation year to 2001 
551 37.031 34.305 1.000 394.000 -0.056 0.107** -
0.152*** 
0.343*** 1   
6.FIRM 
INVENTION 
GENERALITY 
Firm level mean of Patent 
Generalityi. 
 
Patent Generalityi = 1–∑          
where     indicates the share of 
citations received by patent i  
from patents belonging to patent 
class j, out of n patent classes 
 
551 0.365 0.167 0.000 0.775 -0.024 0.013 -0.033 -0.03 -0.093** 1  
7. PATENT 
STRENGTH 
For each European country 
included in this study sample, 
average of the 1995 and 2000 
patent protection indices obtained 
by Park’s (2008) study 
(normalized) 
551 0.898 0.026 0.788 0.921 0.025 0.082* -0.089** -0.067 -0.042 -0.051 1 
a. * p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05;   *** p< 0.0
  
4. RESULTS 
We first estimated the impact of being a technology specialist through an OLS regression 
(Table 4). Model 4.1 estimates the inventive performance of the firm as a function of its 
choice to become a technology specialist and a set of controls and tests Hypothesis 1 that 
technology specialist SMEs display a higher inventive performance than vertically integrated 
SMEs – against the null hypothesis that the inventive performance of technology specialist 
SMEs is not statistically significantly different from the inventive performance of vertically 
integrated SMEs. Results of model 4.1 show that  the coefficient of the variable 
TECHNOLOGY SPECIALIST equals to 0.386, which means technology specialists display 
an inventive performance about 47 per cent greater than the inventive performance of 
vertically integrated firms (p value <0.10). Model 4.2 estimates instead the profitability of the 
firm as a function of its choice to become a technology specialist and a set of controls, and 
tests Hypothesis 2 that technology specialist SMEs display a lower profitability than vertically 
integrated SMEs – against the null hypothesis that the profitability of technology specialist 
SMEs is not statistically significantly different from the profitability of vertically integrated 
SMEs. Results of model 4.2 show that the coefficient of interest equals to -0.490, which 
implies technology specialist are about 39 per cent less profitable than vertically integrated 
SMEs (p value <0.01).  
Table 4. OLS regression estimationa, b 
 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 
 Inventive Performance 
(Log) 
Profitability  
(Log) 
TECHNOLOGY SPECIALIST 0.386* -0.490*** 
 (0.206) (0.124) 
SIZE (Log) 0.147*** 0.006 
 (0.034) (0.020) 
AGE (Log) -0.109** 0.072*** 
 (0.045) (0.027) 
FIRM INVENTION GENERALITY 
(Log) -0.001 -0.031 
 (0.057) (0.034) 
PATENT STRENGTH (Log) 0.129 -0.096 
 (1.197) (0.719) 
Industry dummies Included Included 
Constant  0.671* 4.182*** 
  
 (0.352) (0.211) 
N. Observations 551 551 
R squared 0.073 0.099 
a
* p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05;   *** p< 0.01 
b Since the minimum of the variable FIRM INVENTION GENERALITY is 0, we added 0.01 to the variable before taking the logarithm;  
since the minimum of the variable PROFITABILITY is -81.043, we added 81.053 (|min|+0.01) to the variable before taking the logarithm. 
 
To account for the possibility that firms’ choice to become a technology specialist is 
endogenous to their performance, we employed a two stage least square model (2SLS) 
(Wooldridge, 2002). In implementing this model, we have used the variable TECHNOLOGY 
SPECIALIST as the dependent variable of the first equation, and INVENTIVE 
PERFORMANCE and PROFITABILITY, respectively, as the dependent variables of the 
second stage. We selected the average proportion of technology specialists in the same 
country and similar size of the focal firm as an instrument for the variable TECHNOLOGY 
SPECIALIST. The rationale behind this choice is related to the fact that some exogenous 
characteristics of the country’s institutional environment (for instance, the Intellectual 
Property Right (IPR) protection or the extent of local competition) may affect a SMEs’ 
decision to become technology specialists, and this influence varies according to the firm 
category size. Hence, in calculating this variable we have grouped SMEs in two groups: firms 
with less than 38 employees and firms with over 38 employees, where 38 employees is the 
median number of employees of firms in our sample.  
In Table 5a and 5b we report the results from the 2SLS. Model 5.1 estimates the first 
stage equation, which shows how the average proportion of technology specialists in the same 
country and similar size of the focal firm is positively correlated with the likelihood of the 
focal firm being a technology specialist. Model 5.2 estimates the inventive performance of the 
firm as a function of its choice to become a technology specialist and a set of controls. Model 
5.3 estimates the firm profitability as a function of the firm choice to become a technology 
specialist and a set of controls. Results from both Model 5.2 and Model 5.3 largely confirm 
the results of the OLS model and show that being a technology specialist has a positive 
  
impact on the inventive performance of a firm and a negative impact on firm profitability, 
consistent respectively with our Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
TABLE 5a Two Stage Least Square Regression Estimation: First Stagea, b 
 Model 5.1 
 Technology Specialist  
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE 1.446*** 
 (0.177) 
SIZE (Log) 0.000 
 (0.007) 
AGE (Log) -0.025*** 
 (0.009) 
FIRM INVENTION GENERALITY 
(Log) -0.010 
 (0.011) 
PATENT STRENGTH (Log) 0.240 
 (0.249) 
Industry dummies Included 
Constant  0.101 
 (0.069) 
N. Observations 551 
 
TABLE 5b Two Stage Least Square Regression Estimation: Second Stagea, b 
 Model 5.2 Model 5.3 
 Inventive Performance 
(Log) 
Profitability  
(Log) 
TECHNOLOGY SPECIALIST 2.765*** -2.249*** 
 (0.694) (0.437) 
SIZE (Log) 0.167*** -0.008 
 (0.038) (0.024) 
AGE (Log) -0.014 0.003 
 (0.057) (0.036) 
FIRM INVENTION GENERALITY 
(Log) 0.015 -0.044 
 (0.064) (0.040) 
PATENT STRENGTH (Log) 1.077 -0.797 
 (1.363) (0.859) 
Industry dummies Included Included 
Constant  0.237 4.078*** 
 (0.514) (0.324) 
N. Observations 551 551 
a * p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05;   *** p< 0.01 
b Since the minimum of the variable FIRM INVENTION GENERALITY is 0, we added 0.01 to the variable before taking the logarithm;  
since the minimum of the variable PROFITABILITY is -81.043, we added 81.053 (|min|+0.01) to the variable before taking the logarithm. 
 
  
A possible concern regards the small number of technology specialists in our sample (20 over 
551). To increase comparability among technology specialists and vertically integrated SMEs 
(and also to further address any endogeneity issue) we replicated the analysis on a subsample 
which included technology specialists and a control group constituted by an equal number of 
similar non-technology specialists. In particular, we used a propensity score matching method 
to select the group of vertically integrated firms, similar to the technology specialist firms 
along several important dimensions which could determine the firm choice to become a 
technology specialist (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Hasan et al., 2011; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983), including firm age, size, firm invention generality, industry affiliation and 
appropriability at the country level. For each technology specialist, the closest matching 
company among the vertically integrated firms was chosen. We replicated the OLS regression 
analysis using this subsample of 40 companies. Results are reported in Table 6. Model 6.1 
estimates the inventive performance of the firm as a function of its choice to become a 
technology specialist and the set of controls, while Model 6.2 estimates instead the 
profitability of the firm as a function of its choice to become a technology specialist and the 
set of controls. The results support both Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
Table 6. OLS regression estimation (after matching)a, b 
 Model 6.1 Model 6.2 
 Inventive Performance 
(Log) 
Profitability  
(Log) 
TECHNOLOGY SPECIALIST 0.732** -0.738* 
 (0.329) (0.366) 
SIZE (Log) -0.128 -0.103 
 (0.151) (0.168) 
AGE (Log) -0.110 0.319 
 (0.204) (0.227) 
FIRM INVENTION GENERALITY 
(Log) 0.074 -0.105 
 (0.222) (0.247) 
PATENT STRENGTH (Log) -0.382 -2.489 
 (3.833) (4.260) 
Industry dummies Included Included 
Constant  0.720 4.140** 
 (1.606) (1.785) 
N. Observations 40 40 
R squared 0.240 0.212 
a
* p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05;   *** p< 0.01 
b Since the minimum of the variable FIRM INVENTION GENERALITY is 0, we added 0.01 to the variable before taking the logarithm;  
since the minimum of the variable PROFITABILITY is -81.043, we added 81.053 (|min|+0.01) to the variable before taking the logarithm. 
 
  
 
We also used a quantile regression to estimate the relationship between the choice of being a 
technology specialist and the firm’s inventive performance and profitability. In fact, the 
distributions of the two dependent variables (INVENTIVE PERFORMANCE and 
PROFITABILITY) are characterized by heavy tails. Other studies, whose dependent variables 
were characterized by heavy tails, have employed a quantile regression (Coad and Rao, 2008; 
Koenker and Basset, 1978).  Results (available upon request) are again consistent with our 
theory. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
These results have important implications for practitioners and researchers. 
5.1 Implications to practice 
The results from this paper enhance our understanding of the viable strategies a small firm 
can choose for profiting from its inventions. Our findings suggest that, because of the 
imperfections that plague technology markets and of the low bargaining power of firms 
lacking downstream assets (i.e., technology specialists), the choice of simply selling 
inventions disembodied from products in the MFT (as opposed to directly commercializing 
them to final customers) might not be the best option for SMEs. To be sure, these results 
reflect what happens on average across all industries in all European countries. However, our 
research might suggest that the viability of a technology specialist strategy would increase in 
those industries and/or countries where the strength of the IPR regime or the tendency to 
engage in trust-based behaviours limits the imperfections that hamper the well-functioning of 
MFT. In this respect, future research might better elaborate on the role of environmental and 
firm contingencies that make technology specialist SMEs more profitable than vertically-
integrated SMEs.  
  
The results from this paper also raise implications for policy makers. A key conclusion of 
past literature of MFT is that the diffusion of technology specialists – and the consequent 
development of MFT – is socially desirable because it facilitates the division of innovative 
labour amongst small and large firms, which tend to have a comparative advantage, 
respectively, in generating inventions and commercializing them (e.g., Arora, 2001; Teece, 
1986). However, our study shows that while technology specialist SMEs have better inventive 
performance compared to vertically-integrated SMEs, they also display worse profitability, an 
outcome that over time might reduce the overall number of firms that choose this strategy. 
Hence, our findings have relevant policy implications, because they might imply that the 
number of SMEs deciding to become technology specialists might be lower than optimal.  
For policy-makers, this emphasizes the importance of designing mechanisms that reduce 
the high transaction costs that plague MFT, in order to increase technology specialists’ 
profitability. For instance, policy makers could favour the emergence of specialized 
intermediaries – that is, firms providing services such as patent evaluation, patent 
monetization and patent management, which might contribute to solve some of the 
imperfections affecting MFT (e.g., information asymmetries between buyers and sellers). The 
investigation of the role of intermediaries on the liquidity, transparency and efficiency of the 
MFT may constitute a promising new line of inquiry for future research.   
 
5.2 Implications to theory  
This paper also has implications to theory. First of all, this study better specifies the idea, 
developed by previous contributions on MFT (e.g., Arora et al. 2001), that the division of 
innovative labour amongst small and large firms is optimal for the overall economy. Indeed, 
our study shows that small firms that specialize in upstream activities, as opposed to 
spreading their limited resources among research and commercialization activities, generate 
more valuable inventions. However, since technology specialists are relatively less profitable 
  
than vertically-integrated firms, only a few SMEs may decide to specialize upstream. Thus, 
the potential social benefits associated with the generation of better inventions by technology 
specialists might not be fully realized.  
Second, this paper also has implications for research on firm survival. Recent studies 
have demonstrated the role of inventive performance on firms’ survival (e.g., Cefis and 
Marsili, 2006). By emphasizing that technology specialists achieve a superior inventive 
performance but that these firms experience worse profitability, this study calls for the need to 
improve our understanding of the relationship between inventive performance and firm 
survival. For instance, future research could analyse whether the positive relationship between 
a firm’s inventive performance and survival only holds for those firms that have acquired the 
downstream assets needed to commercialize their inventions to the final customers.  
Finally, the results from this paper might also have implications for research on Venture 
Capital (VC). It is well established that Venture Capital (VC) is crucial for small and young 
firms performance (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002; Samila and Sorenson, 2011). The results of 
this study would suggest that the VC role could be particularly important when MFT are not 
well functioning, and so vertical integration is a better option for small firms in order to profit 
from their inventions. Indeed, VC might provide financially-constrained small firms not only 
with the necessary resources to invest in the acquisition of downstream assets (e.g., Stucki, 
2014), but also with the managerial expertise required to commercialize their products to the 
final customers (e.g., Robson and Bennett, 2000). Hence, an interesting avenue for future 
research could be the exploration of the role played by VC as a potential substitute for MFT. 
 
5.3 Limitations 
This study has some limitations. First, we only considered SMEs inventive performance and 
profitability, but other performance dimensions could be evaluated. For instance, future 
studies could investigate whether the decrease in profitability experienced by technology 
  
specialists is actually traded off with superior growth outcomes in terms of company size, or 
if the choice of being a technology specialist is more appropriate to foster firms’ adaptability 
in the face of a changing environment. In this respect, it could be interesting to replicate this 
study across different time windows in order to see how firms using different strategies react 
to environmental and macroeconomic shocks.  
Second, our sample of technology specialists is quite limited. Two issues might be 
considered in this respect, i.e. whether (1) the data are representative of the overall 
populations of technology specialists in Europe in the time period considered; (2) the results 
obtained are reliable. With regard to the first point, it should be noted that very limited data 
are available publicly on the population of SMEs who are technology specialists. Hence, we 
believe that the selected sample is valuable because it allows us to provide an analysis on the 
behavior of a relevant type of firms that otherwise could not be investigated. 
Regarding the second point, when the independent variable does not display relevant 
variation, there is a high risk of the results not being statistically significant (e.g., Wooldridge, 
2002). Nevertheless, our results are significant. Hence we could argue that what we presented 
was a conservative estimate of the real effect and that our results could be even stronger if we 
had more variation in our main independent variable, that is, if we had a larger number of 
technology specialists.  
Third, this study only focuses on small and medium firms. However, the choice between 
selling an invention in the MFT and embedding it into a product to be sold to final customers 
might in principle also regard other players, like large firms or users. Future research should 
therefore investigate to what extent and under what contingencies these players sell their ideas 
to other firms rather than selling their products to final customers. In addition, we employ a 
cross sectional perspective in our analysis. The investigation of the same issue in a 
longitudinal perspective could potentially lead to insightful results, and also offer the 
possibility to control for firm time-invariant heterogeneity. However, we acknowledge that 
  
the panel data on technology commercialization strategies of small private firms represents a 
challenging task since this data are not available on public or commercial dataset. Future 
research may consider the possibility of using a survey approach in order to obtain some 
insight using a longitudinal dataset. 
Finally, this paper refers to the use of licensing agreements as evidence of the fact that a 
firm pursued a “technology specialist” strategy, i.e. it profited from its inventions by licensing 
them in disembodied form to other firms as opposed to incorporating them into products, and 
investigates the implications related to the use of this strategy on firm profitability and 
inventive performance. It would be very interesting for future research to also investigate the 
antecedents of (i.e. the reasons behind) the firm’s choice to use licensing agreements. In 
addition to a monetary reason, there might be other strategic reasons that led firms to license 
their inventions such as entering a foreign market or setting an industry standard. In this 
respect, whilst the use of secondary data allows conducting such investigation only to a very 
limited extent, the use of surveys or in-depth case studies could provide new relevant insights 
in this area.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the effects of being a technology specialist on firm inventive 
performance and profitability. In particular, the results from this paper show that technology 
specialist SMEs are better performers than vertically-integrated small firms in terms of 
inventiveness, but worse performers in terms of profitability. Focusing their attention on 
inventive activities allows technology specialists to learn how to generate higher quality 
inventions faster than vertically-integrated firms, due to the deeper and broader inventive 
experience technology specialists have the chance to accumulate (Arora et al. 2001; Katila 
and Ahuja, 2002; Yelle, 1979); and to their flexible organization structure (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990; Fosfuri and Roende, 2009). However, the imperfections that plague the 
  
functioning of MFT (Cockburn, 2007), and the higher bargaining power of firms possessing 
commercialization assets vis-a-vis research assets (e.g. Arora and Nandkumar, 2012; Teece, 
1986), lead technology specialists to experience a significantly lower profitability than 
vertically-integrated firms. 
This study has a number of practical and theoretical implications, as already discussed in 
the previous section. One of the most interesting contributions is probably that it emphasizes 
the existence of a conundrum between what would be socially optimal – that is, the division 
of innovative labour amongst large firms, specializing in downstream commercialization, and 
small firms, specializing in inventing – and what would be privately optimal for small firms, 
which instead have the incentive to integrate downstream to better capture the economic 
returns from their inventions. Hence, this study calls for the need to design and implement 
institutional mechanisms aimed at addressing this conundrum and reconciling private with 
social benefits in the context of firms’ inventive activity.  
  
REFERENCES  
 
Ahuja, G., Morris Lampert, C., 2001. Entrepreneurship in the large corporation: A 
longitudinal study of how established firms create breakthrough inventions. Strategic 
Management Journal 22(6‐7), 521-543. 
Allarakhia, M., Walsh, S., 2011. Managing knowledge assets under conditions of radical 
change: the case of the pharmaceutical industry. Technovation  31(2/3), 105–117.  
Apitado, V. P., Millington, J. K., 1992. Restrictive loan covenants and risk adjustment in 
small business lending. Journal of Small Business Management 30(1), 38-48. 
Arora, A., 1996. Contracting for tacit knowledge: The provision of technical services in 
technology licensing contracts. Journal of Development Economics  50(2), 233–256. 
Arora, A., Ceccagnoli, M., 2006. Patent protection, complementary assets and firms' incentives 
for technology licensing. Management Science  52(2), 292–308. 
Arora, A., Fosfuri, A., Gambardella, A., 2001. Markets for Technology: The Economics of 
Innovation and Corporate Strategy. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. 
Arora, A., Gambardella, A., 1990. Complementarity and external linkages: The strategies of the 
large firms in biotechnology. Journal of Industrial Economics  38, 361–379. 
Arora, A., Nandkumar, A., 2012. Insecure advantage? Markets for technology and the value of 
resources for entrepreneurial ventures. Strategic Management Journal  33(3), 221–251. 
Arrow, K. J., 1983. Innovation in large and small firm, in: J. Ronen (Ed.), Entrepreneurship. 
Lexington Books, Lexington, pp. 15-28. 
Beedles, W. L., 1992. Small firm equity cost: evidence from Australia. Journal of Small 
Business Management 30(3), 57-65. 
Beggs, A. W., 1992. The licensing of patents under asymmetric information. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization  10, 171-191. 
Belenzon, S., Patacconi, A., 2013. Innovation and firm value: An investigation of the 
changing role of patents, 1985–2007. Research Policy 42(8), 1496-1510. 
Bercovitz, J., Mitchell, W., 2007. When is more better? The impact of business scale and scope 
on long-term business survival, while controlling for probitability. Strategic Management 
Journal 28, 61-79.   
Berends, H., Jelinek, M., Reymen, I., Stultiëns, R., 2014. Product Innovation Processes in Small 
Firms: Combining Entrepreneurial Effectuation and Managerial Causation. Journal of 
Product Innovation Management 31(3), 616-635.  
Bianchi, M., Cavaliere, A., Chiaroni, D., Frattini, F., Chiesa, V., 2011. Organisational modes for 
Open Innovation in the bio-pharmaceutical industry: An exploratory analysis. Technovation 
31, 22-33.  
  
Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M., 2002. Venture capital in Europe and the financing of innovative 
companies. Economic Policy  17,  229-270. 
Bresnahan, T. F., Trajtenberg, M., 1995. General purpose technologies “Engines of Growth”? 
Journal of Econometrics  65, 83-108.  
Ceccagnoli, M., Jiang, L., 2013. The cost of integrating external technologies: supply and 
demand drivers of value creation in the markets for technology. Strategic Management 
Journal 34, 404-425. 
Cefis, E., Marsili, O., 2006. Survivor: the role of innovation in firms’ survival. Research Policy  
35(5), 626-641. 
Chiu, Y. C., Lai, H. C., Lee, T. Y., Liaw, Y. C. 2008. Technological diversification, 
complementary assets, and performance. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 
75(6), 875-892. 
Coad, A., 2007. A Closer Look at Serial Growth Rate Correlation. Review of Industrial 
Organization  31(1), 69-82. 
Coad, A., Rao, R., 2008. Innovation and firm growth in high-tech sectors: A quantile regression 
approach. Research Policy  37 (4), 633-648. 
Cockburn I, 2007. Is the market for technology working well? Obstacles to licensing and ways to 
overcome them. Conference on Economics of Technology Policy, Monte Verità, 
Switzerland. 
Cohen, W. M., Klepper, S., 1991. The tradeoff between firm size and diversity in the pursuit of 
technological progress. Small Business Economics  4, 1-14.  
Conceicao, O., Fontes, M., Calapez, T., 2012. The commercialization decisions of research-
based spin-off: targeting the market for technologies. Technovation  32, 43-56. 
Danneels, E., 2002. The dynamics of product innovation and firm competences. Strategic 
Management Journal 23(12), 1095-1121. 
Dechenaux, E., Thursby, J., Thursby, M., 2011. Inventor moral hazard in university licensing: 
The role of contracts. Research Policy 40(1), 94-104. 
Dehejia, R. H., Wahba, S., 2002. Propensity score-matching methods for nonexperimental causal 
studies. Review of Economics and Statistics  84(1), 151–161. 
Díez-Vial, I., 2009. Firm Size Effects on Vertical Boundaries. Journal of Small Business 
Management 47(2), 137-153.  
Dosi, G., Marengo, L., Pasquali, C., 2006. How much should society fuel the greed of 
innovators? On the relations between appropriability, opportunities and rates of innovation. 
Research Policy 35, 1110-1121. 
  
Dowling, M., Helm, R., 2006. Product development success through cooperation: A study of 
entrepreneurial firms. Technovation 26, 483-488. 
 Dushnitsky, G., 2010. Entrepreneurial optimism in the market for technological inventions. 
Organization Science 21(1), 150-167. 
Feldman, M., 1997. Small Firm Innovative Success: External Resources and Barriers, Maryann 
Feldman and Associates, Baltimore MD. 
Firth, R. W., Narayanan, W. K., 1996. New Product Strategies of Large, Dominant Product 
Manufacturing Firms: An Exploratory Analysis. Journal of Product Innovation Management 
13, 334-347.  
Fosfuri, A., Roende, T., 2009. Leveraging resistance to change and the skunk works model of 
innovation. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization  72(1): 274-289. 
Fosfuri, A., 2006. The licensing dilemma: understanding the determinants of the rate of 
technology licensing. Strategic Management Journal  27(12), 1141–1158. 
Freeman, C., Soete, L., 1997. The Economics of Industrial Innovation, Pinter, London. 
Frietsch, R., Neuhäusler, P., Jung, T., Van Looy, B., 2014. Patent indicators for macroeconomic 
growth—the value of patents estimated by export volume. Technovation 34, 546-558.  
Galasso, A., Simcoe, T., 2011. CEO Overconfidence and Innovation. Management Science 57, 
1469-1484. 
Gambardella, A., Giarratana, M., 2013. General Technological Capabilities, Product Market 
Fragmentation, and Markets for Technology.  Research Policy 42, 315-325. 
Gambardella, A., 2013. The economic value of patented inventions: Thoughts and some open 
questions. International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (5), 626-633. 
Gans, J. S., Hsu, D. H., Stern, S., 2002. When does start-up innovation spur the gale of creative 
destruction? RAND Journal of Economics  33(4), 571-586. 
Gans, J. S., Hsu, D. H., Stern, S., 2008. The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on 
the market for ideas: evidence from patent grant delays. Management Science  54, 982-997. 
Ginarte, J. C., Park, W. G., 1997. Determinants of patent rights: a cross-national study. Research 
Policy  26, 283-301. 
Giuri, P., Mariani, M., Brusoni, S., Crespi, G., Francoz, D., Gambardella, A., Garcia-Fontes, W., 
Geuna, A., Gonzales, R., Harhoff, D., Hoisl, K., Le Bas, C., Luzzi, A., Magazzini, L., Nesta, 
L., Nomaler, Ö., Palomeras, N., Patel, P., Romanelli, M., Verspagen, B., 2007. Inventors and 
invention processes in Europe: results from the PatVal-EU Survey. Research Policy  36(8), 
1107-1127. 
Glasmeier, A. K., 1991. Technological discontinuities and flexible production networks. The 
case of Switzerland and the world watch industry. Research Policy  21, 469-485. 
  
Gouvea, R., Linton, J. D., Montoya, M., Walsh, S. T., 2012. Emerging technologies and ethics: 
A race-to-the-bottom or the top?. Journal of Business Ethics 109(4), 553-567. 
Grant, R., 2002. Contemporary Strategy Analysis,  Blackwell Publishing, Malden MA.  
Griliches, Z., 1984. R&D, Patents and Productivity, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Griliches, Z., 1990. Patent statistics as economic indicators: a survey. Journal of Economic 
Literature  27, 1661-1707. 
Gupta, A. K., Smith, K. G., Shalley, C. E., 2006. The interplay between exploration and 
exploitation. Academy of Management Journal 49(4), 693-706. 
Hall, B., Jaffe, A., Trajtenberg, M., 2000. Market value and patent citations: a first look. NBER 
Working Paper No.7741, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, Cambridge, MA. 
Hall, B. H., Jaffe, A., Trajtenberg, M., 2005. Market value and patent citations. RAND Journal 
of Economics  36(1), 16-38.  
Hall, H. B., Thoma, G., Torrisi, S., 2007. The market value of patents and R&D: Evidence from 
European firms. Working paper 13426, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
Mass. 
Harhoff, D., Hoisl, K., Webb, C., 2006. European patent citations – How to count and how to 
interpret them? University of Munich and CEPR (London), University of Munich, and 
OECD. 
Hasan, I., Kobeissi, N., Wang, H., 2011. Global equity offerings, corporate valuation, and 
subsequent international diversification. Strategic Management Journal  32(7), 787-796. 
Henderson, R., 1993. Underinvestment and incompetence as responses to radical innovation. 
evidence from the photolithographic industry. Rand Journal of Economics  24(2), 248-270. 
Henderson, R., Clark, K. B., 1990. Architectural innovation: the reconfiguration of existing 
product technologies and the failure of established firms. Administrative Science Quarterly  
35(1), 9-30. 
Hess, A. M., Rothaermel, F. T., 2011. When are assets complementary? Star scientists, strategic 
alliances, and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. Strategic Management Journal 32, 
895-909.  
Hicks, D., Hegde, D., 2005. Highly innovative small firms in the markets for technology. 
Research Policy 34(5), 703-716. 
Hoffman, K., Parejo, M., Bessant, J., Perren, L., 1998. Small firms, R&D, technology and 
innovation in the UK: a literature review. Technovation  18(1), 39-55. 
Holmstrom, B., 1989. Agency costs and innovation. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization  12(3), 305-327. 
  
Katila, R., 2002. New Product Search Over Time: Past Ideas in their Prime? Academy of 
Management Journal  45(5), 995-1010. 
Katila, R., Ahuja, G., 2002. Something old, something new: a longitudinal study on search 
behaviour and new product introduction. Academy of Management Journal  45(6), 1183-
1194. 
Kelley, D. J., Ali, A., Zahra, S. A., 2013. Where Do Breakthroughs Come From? Characteristics 
of High-Potential Inventions. Journal of Product Innovation Management 30(6), 1212-1226.  
Koen, M. S., 1992. Business Intellectual Property Prediction. MOSCI Corporation, Rolla MO. 
Koenker, R., Bassett, G, 1978. Regression quantiles. Econometrica  46(1), 33–50. 
Krammer, M. S. S., 2014. Assessing the relative importance of multiple channels for embodied 
and disembodied technological spillovers. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 81, 
272-286. 
Laursen, K., Salter, A., 2014. The Paradox of Openness: Appropriability, External Search and 
Collaboration. Research Policy 43(5), 867-878. 5 
Leiblein, M. J., Madsen, T. L., 2009. Unbundling competitive heterogeneity: incentive structures 
and capability influences on technological innovation. Strategic Management Journal 30, 
711-735.  
Leone, M. I., Reichstein, T., 2012. Licensing-in fosters rapid invention! the effect of the grant-
back clause and technological unfamiliarity. Strategic Management Journal 33(8), 965-985. 
Leuven, E., Sianesi, B., 2003. PSMATCH2: Stata module to perform full Mahalanobis and 
propensity score matching, common support graphing, and covariate imbalance testing. 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html  
Li, H., Tang, M., 2010. Vertical integration and innovative performance: The effects of external 
knowledge sourcing modes. Technovation 30, 401-410.  
Linton, J., Walsh, S., 2013. The effect of technology on learning during the acquisition and 
development of competencies in technology-intensive small firms. International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research  19(2), 3-3. 
Mangematin, V., Errabi, K., Gauthier, C., 2011. Large players in the nanogame: dedicated 
nanotech subsidiaries or distributed nanotech capabilities? The Journal of Technology 
Transfer 36(6), 640–664. 
Marion, T. J., Friar, J. H., Simpson, T. W., 2012. New Product Development Practices and 
Early-Stage Firms: Two In-Depth Case Studies. Journal of Product Innovation Management 
29, 639-654.  
Mariotti, S., Cainarca, G. C., 1986. The evolution of transaction governance in the textile 
clothing industry. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization  7, 351-374.  
  
Mas-Ruiz, F., Ruiz-Moreno, F., 2011. Rivalry within strategic groups and consequences for 
performance: the firm-size effects. Strategic Management Journal 32, 1286-1308. 
McGahan, A. M., Silverman, B. S., 2006. Profiting from technological innovation by others: The 
effect of competitor patenting on firm value. Research Policy 35(8), 1222–1242. 
O’Connor, G. C., DeMartino, R., 2006. Organizing for Radical Innovation: An Exploratory 
Study of the Structural Aspects of RI Management Systems in Large Established Firms. 
Journal of Product Innovation Management 23, 475-497. 
OECD, 1997, Small Business, Job Creation and Growth: Facts, Obstacles and Best Practices, 
available at www.oecd.org/cfe/smes/2090740.pdf. 
Park, W. G., 2008. International patent protection: 1960-2005. Research Policy  37, 761-766. 
Powell, T. C., 1992. Strategic Planning as Competitive Advantage. Strategic Management 
Journal 13(7), 551-558. 
Revilla, A. J., Fernandez, Z., 2012. The relation between firm size and R&D productivity in 
different technological regimes. Technovation 32, 609-623. 
Ritala, P., Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, P., 2009. What’s in it for me? Creating and appropriating 
value in innovation-related coopetition. Technovation 29, 819-828. 
Robson, P. J. A., Bennett, R. J., 2000. SME growth: The relationship with business advice and 
external collaboration. Small Business Economics 15, 193-208. 
Rosenbaum, P. R., Rubin, D. B., 1983. The central role of the propensity score in observational 
studies for causal effects. Biometrika  70(1): 41–55. 
Rosenzweig, S., Mazursky, D., 2013.  Constraints of Internally and Externally Derived 
Knowledge and the Innovativeness of Technological Output: The Case of the United States. 
Journal of Product Innovation Management 31(2), 231-246 
Rothwell, R., Zegveld, W., 1982. Innovation and the Small and Medium-Sized Firm, Pinter, 
London. 
Rubenstein, A. H., Ettlie, J. E., 1983. Radical Technology, Organization Science, Structure and 
Context in the Innovation Process, Applied Science and Technology Association, Evanston 
IL. 
Sakakibara, M., 2010. An empirical analysis of pricing in patent licensing contracts. Industrial 
and Corporate Change 19(3), 927-945. 
Samila, S., Sorenson, O., 2011. Venture capital, entrepreneurship, and economic growth. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics  93,  338-349. 
Shane, S., 2002. Selling university technology: Patterns from MIT. Management Science  48(1), 
122–138.  
  
Shefer, D., Frenkel, A., 2005. R&D, firm size and innovation: an empirical analysis. 
Technovation 25, 25-32. 
Smith, A., 1776 [1983]. The Wealth of Nations,  Penguin Papers, Harmondsworth, UK. 
Somaya, D., Kim, Y., Vonortas, N. S., 2010. Exclusivity in licensing alliances: using hostages to 
support technology commercialization. Strategic Management Journal 32, 159-186.   
Sørensen, J. B., Stuart, T., E., 2000. Aging, obsolescence, and organizational innovation. 
Administrative Science Quarterly  45(1),  81-112. 
Sreekumaran, S. N., Mathew, N., Nag, D. 2011. Dynamics between patent latent variables and 
patent price. Technovation 31, 648-654.  
Stigler, G., 1951. The division of labour is limited by the extent of the market. Journal of 
Political Economy  59, 185-193. 
Stucki, T., 2014. Success of start-up firms. The role of financial constraints. Industrial and 
Corporate Change  23(1), 25-64. 
Taylor, A., Helfat, C. E., 2009. Organizational Linkages for Surviving Technological Change: 
Complementary Assets, Middle Management, and Ambidexterity. Organization Science 
20(4), 718-739.  
Teece, D. J., 1986. Profiting from technological innovation: implications for integration, 
collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy  15, 285–305. 
Trajtenberg, M., 1990. A penny for your quotes: Patent citations and the value of innovations. 
RAND Journal of Economics  21(1), 172-187. 
Trajtenberg, M., Henderson, R., Jaffe, A., 1997. University vs. corporate patents: a window on 
the basicness of invention. Economics of Innovation and New Technology  5(1), 19-50. 
Tripsas, M., 1997. Unraveling the process of creative destruction: complementary assets and 
incumbent survival in the typesetter industry. Strategic Management Journal 18 (Summer 
Special Issue), 119–142. 
Valentini, G., 2012. Measuring the Effect of M&A on Patenting Quantity and Quality. Strategic 
Management Journal 33, 336-346. 
Veer, T., Jell, F., 2012. Contributing to markets for technology? A comparison of patent filing 
motives of individual inventors, small companies and universities. Technovation 32, 513-
522. 
Wang, Y., Vanhaverbeke, W., Roijakkers, N., 2012. Exploring the impact of open innovation on 
national systems of innovation - A theoretical analysis.  Technological Forecasting & Social 
Change 79, 419-428.  
  
Winter, S. G., 1987. Knowledge and competence as strategic assets, in: Teece, D. J. (Ed.),  The 
competitive challenge: Strategies for Industrial Innovation and Renewal, Ballinger, 
Cambridge, MA, pp. 159-184. 
WIPO, 2014. 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/licensing/903/wipo_pub_903.pdf. 
Wooldridge, J. M., 2002. Econometric analysis of cross-section and panel data, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachussets. 
Yadav, M. S., Prabhu, J. C., Chandy, R. K., 2007. Managing the future: CEO attention and 
innovation outcomes. Journal of Marketing, 71 (4), 84-101. 
Yelle, L. E., 1979. The learning curve. Historical review and comprehensive survey. Decision 
Science  10, 302-328.  
Young, A., 1928. Increasing returns and economic progress. Economic Journal  38, 527-542. 
